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Why Potential 2010 Candidates Have Cold Feet…For Now

by Dr. Susan MacManus
January 28, 2009

It is no surprise that the tossing of many tried-and-true “conventional wisdoms” out the window has made a number of potential U.S. Senate, gubernatorial, and Cabinet candidates a bit hesitant to toss their hats into the ring for the 2010 races.

Election 2008 proved to be one of the longest, most contentious, costly, and unpredictable elections in quite some time. While the campaign’s many surprising twists and turns kept the public engaged at record levels, it gave the candidates ulcers. The predictions of high profile, respected pundits and the advice given candidates by their top dollar political consultants (based on previous elections) often turned out to be dead wrong.

Here is but a sampling of the more famously inaccurate predictions made within a year of the election as they affected Florida:

  • Front-runners in horse-race polls for months on end are surely to be the nominees. As early as the summer of 2007, everyone assumed that the major national party tickets were sure to be headed by New Yorkers—Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Rudy Giuliani. But no one predicted how Florida’s decision to front-load its presidential primary would dash both expectations. Had the Florida Legislature voted to hold the state’s primary on February 5, Hillary Clinton would very likely have won it just as she did on January 29 (Clinton 49.7%, Obama 33.0%). Clinton would have exited from Super Tuesday with her front-runner status secure, having carried three of the nation’s four largest states (California, New York, Florida) and many others. She very likely would have gone on to secure the nomination. As for Giuliani, he put all his eggs in the Florida primary basket, and when they didn’t hatch, he was finished.
  • The Republican presidential nomination fight would be the most contentious and last the longest. Obviously, the reverse was true. How quickly we forget that the race started with 11 GOP candidates and 8 Democratic candidates but the Democratic race lasted right up to the national party convention in Denver. Florida’s delegates were part of the suspense right up to the end.
  • Republicans would maintain their fund-raising superiority in Florida and nationally. To the contrary, Barack Obama raised more money in Florida than John McCain ($15,609,133 v. $14,015,618—opensecrets.org). Nationally, Obama outraised McCain $743 million to $367 million. However, it was true that of the $146.9 million in total contributions to all federal candidates made by Floridians in 2007-2008 (PAC contributions to candidates, individual contributions ($200+) to candidates and parties, and soft money contributions to parties), 55.8% went to Republican candidates and 43.9% to Democrats.
  • There would be little change in the most important issue. The dominant issue would be the War in Iraq. If anything, the 2008 election showed the rapidity with which issue shifts occurred, with Florida being a leading indicator. The War in Iraq dominated until surging gas prices exceeding the $4 per gallon mark (and a decline in the number of American soldier fatalities) pushed the War issue aside. The drilling issue was, in turn, replaced by the economy following the meltdown on Wall Street. In each instance, Florida polls detected the issue shifts earlier than the national polls.
  • Long, contentious, and divisive primaries hurt rather than help the eventual nominee. Party chairs were hopeful that the primary battles would be over by Super Tuesday, their rationale being that an early nominee would: (1) allow their party’s candidate to raise (and spend) more money on the general election phase of the campaign, and (2) minimize the need to rebuild party unity.  As it turned out, McCain’s early securing of the nomination (thanks in large part to Florida), made it more difficult for him to get much-needed media coverage for several months while the Clinton-Obama battle played out. The McCain campaign simply wasn’t as interesting a story as the battle between the potential trailblazers until the Republican National Convention in late August, when McCain announced Sarah Palin as his running mate. Consequently, the protracted primary competition between Clinton and Obama turned out to be quite beneficial to nominee Obama, giving him a chance to hone his message and debate skills.
  • Senior voters would be the most heavily targeted age cohort. Many analysts assumed that once again, seniors would be the most heavily targeted age cohort in Florida and the U.S. at-large. Instead, it was the youngest cohort. The Obama campaign had done its homework and picked up on the fact that Florida’s younger voters had been trending Democratic for the past three election cycles. They hired campaign workers who aggressively targeted Florida’s college campuses from the get-go—registering record numbers, then kept in touch with them right to election day via Internet-based technologies (YouTube, candidate e-mails, etc.). It paid off. Younger voters were the most solidly Obama voting bloc (66% voted for him), older voters, the least (48%).
  • The Bradley effect would be in play in Florida in a big way due to its high incidence of non-college-educated whites and its sizable Hispanic population. Specifically, there was a fear that a significant number of older, non-college educated white and Hispanic voters might tell pollsters they were supporting Obama but then in the privacy of the voting booth, resist voting for the African American for race-based reasons. In fact, 41% of Florida’s white voters with no college education and 57% of the state’s Hispanic voters cast their ballots for Obama (presidential exit poll data).
  • More Democrats would crossover and vote for McCain than Republicans crossing over and voting for Obama. This expectation was, in large part, driven by predictions that a sizable portion of women who voted for Hillary in the primary would crossover and vote for the McCain-Palin ticket. As it turned out, 12% of Democratic voters supported McCain and 12% of Republican voters cast their ballots for Obama. Nationally, 15% of those who voted for McCain said they would have voted for Hillary had she been on the ballot instead of Obama. While a comparable figure was not available for Florida at the time this column was written, it is likely the percent may have been a bit smaller, primarily because Hillary Clinton came to Florida several times after the convention urging her supporters to vote for Obama.
  • The Republican Get-Out-The-Vote program would again be superior to that of the Democrats. Not true. It became quite evident with early voting that the GOP GOTV machine was not as well-oiled as in 2004. The Obama campaign, with its tremendously large financial edge, put a lot of effort into GOTV at the early voting stage. Higher Democratic turnout figures were touted via press releases, as were the “results” which were discerned by campaign samples of the candidate preference of early voters. It was quite effective; some GOP analysts estimate that it tamped down GOP turnout in Florida by 1-2%.
  • Negative ads would be effective, as usual. Some of the nation’s best “adsters” are located right here in the sunshine state. For years, they have preached to candidates that negative ads work. There is evidence they may have been less effective than usual in 2008. McCain ran more of them than Obama. Over a five month period, 47% of McCain spots were negative compared to 39% of Obama’s ads. The further behind McCain got in the polls near the end of the election, the more negative ads he ran which caused tensions even among his own campaign staff. One GOP pollster had some rather strong words for the propensity of many in his party to point fingers at everything and everyone for McCain’s loss, instead of at its negative ads: “The blame was placed on everyone and everything but the issue-less, relentlessly negative campaigns that party operatives have promoted for years…This year, the same players dragged out the same, tired negative campaign strategy and, not surprisingly, the party hit a brick wall.” This phenomenon was apparent in Florida well in advance of November 4. A statewide poll of 600 likely Florida voters conducted in October found that one-fifth – 21 percent – were less inclined to vote for McCain because of his attacks on Democrat Barack Obama. Twenty percent of independents said the ads cooled them to McCain, as did 9 percent of Republicans.

Worry Warts in Both Parties

It’s understandable why so many potential candidates for statewide posts are weighing the pros and cons of the races before jumping into fast-churning waters.

Democrats worry that:

  1. The money edge present in 2008 won’t be there for candidates in the mid-term 2010 election.
  2. The organizational superiority evidenced by the Obama campaign cannot be sustained in periods of economic decline.
  3. Obama’s coattails, which were not very long in 2008, will not be very long in 2010 either. 
  4. The turnout rate for young voters will dip considerably below than in 2008, as it usually does in gubernatorial election years.
  5. The turnout rate for African Americans will dip below that in 2008.
  6. Republicans will grab back some of the growing Hispanic vote.
  7. Florida is still more a red than blue state.

Republicans fear that:

  1. The money edge will go to Democrats (the party holding the White House benefits), making it easier to raise funds and recruit credible, competitive candidates.
  2. The gender gap will continue; it may well if Republicans don’t start to recruit more women for positions in high places as they once did in the Toni Jennings era.
  3. The youth vote is “lost” to the Democrats; it’s often said that if the candidate choice of a first-time voter wins, he/she will be locked into that party for nearly a lifetime.
  4. There is uncertainty as to what position Governor Crist will ultimately seek—Governor or the U.S. Senate.
  5. Winning back the Hispanic vote will be extremely difficult.
  6. Growing divisions between conservative and moderate Republicans will make it harder to achieve turnout levels among GOPers reached in 2002 (Jeb’s second term) and 2004 (George W.’s second term)
  7. Florida has now become a blue state.

And potential candidates from both parties fear the issues will shift several times over the next two years.

All these anxieties help explain the dearth of candidates for statewide posts at this time. Deciding to run in a large, unpredictable state like Florida is sort of like gambling without knowing the odds. You enter largely on the basis of a gut feeling that you can win.
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